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Theme: Despite its domestic political problems and the major challenges facing the EU, in 
the second half of 2010 Belgium managed the Council’s rotating Presidency effectively 
and pragmatically. 
 
 
Summary: Belgium has used her federal political structure and experienced public 
administration to counter speculative fears of a weak Presidency at a time when the EU 
had to address difficult challenges. By functioning as a ‘caretaker’ Presidency, EU policy-
making output has been substantial. It furthermore managed to give full attention to the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the new EU institutional set-
up. 
 
 
 
Analysis: When Belgium’s federal government collapsed in April 2010 and elections were 
held the following 13 June, the country’s political parties knew that they would be unable 
to forge a coalition agreement before the Belgian Presidency began. Initially, the victors in 
the elections aimed to reach an agreement before the end of the summer recess in order 
to be able to exercise effective leadership in September 2010. Until that time, the 
chairmanship of the Council’s rotating Presidency would be held by the caretaker 
government. Despite their good intentions, there was the risk of coalition building 
overshadowing the Belgian rotating Presidency and jeopardising its success. Eventually 
the impasse in forming a new government persisted and carried on throughout the entire 
second half of 2010, leaving the country for over 200 days without a government, with 
Yves Leterme’s caretaker administration presiding over Belgium’s 12th rotating Council 
Presidency. 
 
Exercising a rotating Council Presidency is a demanding task for any country but also an 
opportunity for gaining political influence and engaging in some an image building before 
the outside world. On this occasion, Belgium risked gaining nothing, be it influence or 
image. However, the fears of a weak Czech-like Presidency1 were exaggerated as 
Belgium could count on two safeguards: its federal system and the Lisbon Treaty. It could 
even be argued that the Belgian Presidency has allowed a more pronounced shift from a 
political to an administrative leadership of the Presidency. This paper discusses the 
factors that have contributed to Belgium’s successful and pragmatic Presidency, despite 
having operated under complex and difficult circumstances. 
 
 
                                                 
* EU analyst, former researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS ), Brussels. 
1 Piotr Maciej Kaczynski, ‘Lessons from the Czech EU Presidency’, 4/IX/2009, 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/lessons-czech-eu-presidency. 
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Domestic Political Impasse: Risking Image and Influence 
The image of Belgium on both the international and national scenarios has been under 
pressure. The rotating Presidency provides the country concerned with a high degree of 
visibility that it usually exploits to carry out country-branding campaigns, such as those 
promoted by Belgium on this occasion.2 However, certain events involving high-profile 
politicians were adversely affected by the political instability, while the caretaker 
government was voted out in the June 2010 elections. Besides, the cultural campaigns 
implemented to promote Belgium were counter to public sensitivity due to the current 
debates on the country’s further federalisation. Nevertheless, it was the 12th time the 
Belgians had held the Presidency and the vast experience and success accumulated in 
previous turns had its advantages. Furthermore, the traditionally pro-EU stance of 
Belgium’s political class had resulted in Belgians holding prominent EU positions3 and 
their experience and dedication to the EU contributed to softening the damage done to the 
country’s image. 
 
But the question remained whether dedication and experience would be enough for 
Belgium to take the effective lead of the Council of Ministers. There were several 
difficulties that threatened the positive outcome of the Belgian Presidency. First, the 
caretaker government faced a weakened democratic legitimacy as the elections in June 
2010 resulted in the coalition parties losing significant support. Secondly, there was the 
possibility of the caretaker government being followed by a new government, potentially 
delaying the EU’s decision-making. And, third, the country’s efforts were limited by the 
burden of domestic political energy being focused on forming a new coalition. Despite 
these start-up challenges, the Presidency can be said to have been a success, measured 
by its legislative and non-legislative output. Several factors contributed to this, including 
Belgium’s federal structure and the EU’s new institutional set-up under the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Belgian Federalism: Continuity in Crisis 
Belgium’s federal structure provides for complementary competences between various 
regional and community governments and the federal government. This means that the 
collapse of the federal government in April 2010 did not stop the regional and community 
governments from having a politically legitimised leadership over certain Council 
formations. The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) is chaired by the High Representative (HR), 
Catherine Ashton, and did not include a major political role for the Belgian Presidency. Of 
the other nine Council formations, in five cases Belgian political leadership was affected 
because they were expected to be chaired by Federal Ministers. These were: 
 
• General Affairs Council (GAC): Minister of Foreign Affairs (primarily), Minister of 
Defence and Minister of Development. 
• Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN): Minister of Finance and 
Secretary of State for the Budget. 
• Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA): Minister of Justice, Minister of the Interior 
and Minister for Employment. 
• Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO): 
Minister for Employment and Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health. 
                                                 
2 The Presidency organised over 800 seminars and cultural events in Belgium and over 80 seminars and 
cultural events within the EU (http://www.eutrio.be). 
3 For example: Herman van Rompuy as President of the European Council, Karel de Gucht as Commissioner 
for Trade and Guy Verhofstadt as leader of ALDE group in the European Parliament. 
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• Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE): Minister of Energy, 
Secretary of State for Mobility and Minister for Enterprises. 
 
The Agriculture and Fisheries Council (AGRI) and the Competition Council (COMPET) 
were partially affected by the fall of the government. In AGRI, the Federal Minister of 
Agriculture dropped out, but the regional Flemish Minister-President responsible for 
fisheries remained. In COMPET, the Federal Minister for Enterprises dropped out, but the 
Walloon Minister of Economy, the Brussels Minister for Scientific Research and the 
Tourism Minister of the German-speaking Community stayed. The Council formations for 
the Environment (ENVI) and Education, Youth and Culture (EYC) remained under the 
lead of Ministers of the regions and/or communities and were not affected by the fall of the 
government. 
 
Overall, this meant that most, but not all, Council formations were affected by the fall of 
the federal government. Belgium’s federal structure helped weather to a significant degree 
the caretaker government’s weakened legitimacy. Had it occurred, the negative impact of 
a mid-term government change on the Presidency’s effectiveness would also have been 
softened by the system. The continuity of the caretaker government averted the risk of 
new and inexperienced Ministers working on European and international dossiers. 
Looking at the impact of the Belgian coalition formation on its Presidency, it can be said 
that it dominated the domestic political debate. At the same time, it allowed the caretaker 
government to focus more on the Presidency. Nevertheless, the uncertainty of Belgium’s 
future set the tone in the international media, resulting in the financial markets fearing a 
potential split in the country. Since the restoration of trust in the Eurozone economies is 
high on the EU agenda, the Presidency was confronted with the task of advocating the 
stability of the Belgian economy. But as the caretaker government did not have the first 
hand in forming the coalition, its role in rationalising speculations was limited. This role 
was reserved for the two main negotiating parties.4 A caretaker with less political leverage 
was therefore bound to rely to a greater extent on its public administration. 
 
Also, the EU’s new institutional set-up after the Lisbon Treaty contributed to a more 
pragmatic focus of the Presidency. It could be argued that the new set-up has detracted 
political leadership from the rotating Presidency. Besides, in Belgium’s case, it has also 
helped avoid a gridlock in EU decision-making. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty: Towards a Lower-Profile Rotating Presidency 
A weak political leadership in a rotating Presidency will be partially compensated by the 
Council’s new institutional set-up following the Lisbon Treaty. Several actors contribute to 
this: the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the 
European Council, the trio-Presidency, the Council’s General Secretariat and COREPER. 
Together they help to prevent a gridlock in decision-making and generate substantial 
output. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty provides for the HR to chair the FAC (Art. 18 (3) TEU). Also, the 
creation of the permanent European Council President removes any special role for the 
Prime Minister of the country holding the rotating Presidency. The GAC now has the task 
of preparing the agendas for the European Council meetings in cooperation with its 
                                                 
4 The Flemish National Party (NV-A) and the Walloon Socialist Party (PS) are the two main parties in the 
coalition talks. NV-A President Bart de Wever repeated several times to the international media that his party 
aims for incremental steps towards a more confederal system. A sudden split of the country is not part of their 
strategy. 
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permanent President (Art. 15(6b)) TEU). Under this provision, the rotating Presidency and 
the permanent President work closely together. This could mean that, in the event of the 
rotating Presidency being weakened by national political problems, the permanent 
President can take a stronger role in preparing European Council meetings and 
overseeing the GAC. 
 
In the Belgian case, the European Council’s permanent President was on close terms with 
the rotating Presidency since he was the country's former Prime Minister. In the long run, 
this is likely to strengthen Herman van Rompuy's position at the European level vis-à-vis 
other actors, especially the Council's rotating Presidency. The particular situation where a 
former Belgian Prime Minister has numerous informal contacts with sectoral Ministers of 
the rotating Presidency gives rise to an opportunity for political supervision by the 
permanent President of the European Council. The sustainability of his position will be 
tested in 2011. 
 
Ending a Period of Lisbon Treaty Transition 
While the Lisbon Treaty introduced provisions to guarantee the consistency of the 
Council's work, it also introduced uncertainty for the rotating Presidency. Spain, which 
held the first Presidency under the Lisbon Treaty, had to confront the ambiguities of the 
new institutional set-up. Its programme gave priority to the implementation of the new 
Treaty, but domestic political problems took up most of its energies. The economic crisis 
hit the country hard and rising unemployment required the immediate attention of Spain’s 
Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Additionally, the Greek crisis spilled over 
to other Eurozone members, in particular to Spain, Portugal and Ireland. This increased 
the need for immediate coordination at the European level, an opportunity for Herman van 
Rompuy to take action. He launched a task force of EU Finance Ministers with the aim of 
achieving more effective economic coordination. Given the results, the permanent 
President seems to have used this initiative to tap into the work of the Council, a sign of 
institutional overseeing. While Spain could have considered that this was against its 
interests, there is no reason to doubt that the Belgians have had a different view of the 
role the European Council President should play. 
 
Besides strengthening the position of the European Council’s permanent President, the 
Belgians also aimed to remove doubts about who is responsible for external relations. In 
an interview with the EU Observer (20/V/2010), the Belgian EU Ambassador, Jean De 
Ruyt said: ‘Our ambition is to make sure that the working Presidency no longer has 
anything to do with external relations by the end of the term’. While the Spanish 
Presidency questioned the role of the HR, especially regarding relations between the EU 
and former colonies, Belgium made it a top priority to overcome any ambiguity on the 
EU’s external representation and to support the HR in the challenging task of creating the 
External Action Service. 
 
By prioritising the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the Belgian Presidency attempted 
to end the transitional period of the new institutional set-up. This included the termination 
of political responsibility for the Union’s external action by the rotating Presidency. The 
effect of the Belgian efforts to crystallise the post-Lisbon Treaty institutional set-up should 
become more evident over time. For the Hungarian Presidency (in the first half of 2011) a 
similar focus on a more administrative leadership can be expected, as opposed to taking 
a strong politically-driven lead. However, the Polish Presidency in the second half of 2011 
might exercise a stronger political approach and challenge the role of the European 
Council’s permanent President and of the High Representative. 
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Other Affairs 
The challenges faced by the Belgian Presidency and the factors contributing to an 
effective administrative leadership of the Council formations have passed muster. The 
Belgian intention of ending the Lisbon Treaty’s transitional period has also been 
discussed. Whether they have managed to do so will be seen in the longer term and the 
upcoming year will prove crucial in this. For now, the Belgian Presidency will be judged 
mainly on its tangible output, several highlights of which are described in the following 
sections. 
 
General and External Affairs 
‘It’s spectacular’ said Olivier Chastel, the Belgian Secretary of State for European Affairs, 
about the agreement on the European Citizens’ Initiative (EU Observer, 16/XII/2010). This 
mechanism of participatory democracy became a reality during the Belgian Presidency. 
The transnational initiative is the first of its kind in which the EU’s citizens can participate 
directly in policy making. The tool still needs to be developed, but it is expected to prove 
useful for the European Parliament (EP) to mobilise its constituents to ask the European 
Commission to come forward with a legislative proposal. The creation of the European 
Citizens’ Initiative was part of the Lisbon Treaty and was therefore high on the 
Presidency’s agenda. However, no prior agreement in the Council was evident. 
 
As mentioned above, Belgium aimed to facilitate to the fullest the development of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). While the initial steps for the creation of the 
EEAS were made during the Spanish Presidency, Belgium managed to finalise an 
agreement on staffing and financing, allowing the HR Ashton to start building her 
executive team. 
 
Enlargement was also dealt with during the Presidency. Accession talks were opened with 
Iceland and significant progress was made with Croatia. Belgium’s support for Serbia’s 
candidacy put pressure on the Dutch political position, while Montenegro was granted 
candidate status at the EU leaders’ summit on 16-17 December. A disappointing aspect of 
the Presidency was the failure to make progress with the negotiations for the accession of 
Turkey. 
 
In Trade, the Presidency took an important step by granting Pakistan commercial 
concessions following the destructive floods. Despite the concerns voiced by Italy’s car 
industry, the EU also signed a free-trade agreement with South-Korea. 
 
Competitiveness and Economic and Financial Affairs 
A significant agreement was reached on the financial supervision package, creating four 
new supervisory bodies: the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), focusing on macro-
prudential supervision; the European Banking Authority; the European Securities and 
Markets Authority; and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (the 
latter three all European Supervisory Authorities, or ESAs). The involvement of the EP in 
achieving this agreement was a priority for the Belgian Presidency, stressing its interest in 
allowing the Parliament to establish its own position in the post-Lisbon Treaty institutional 
set-up. 
 
Throughout the Belgian Presidency, the debate on strengthening economic governance 
focused on the Economic and Financial Affairs Council. In cooperation with Herman van 
Rompuy’s informal task-force, the Council managed to push through the debate on 
budgetary discipline, growth and macroeconomic stability. While the division of 
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competences between the informal task-force and the formal ECOFIN Council were 
sometimes ambiguous and the cause of conflict, the Belgian Presidency managed to 
successfully cooperate with the European Council’s permanent President. This resulted in 
the creation of a crisis resolution system whose aim was to safeguard the stability of the 
Euro. 
 
The third important step taken by the Council was the budget for 2011. Halfway through 
the Belgian Presidency the budget appeared to be blocked when the EP demanded a 
6.2% increase and the Council failed to come to an agreement. Finally, the EP agreed to 
a 2.9% increase in exchange for pledges of the upcoming Presidencies to involve the 
Parliament in the negotiations over the next multi-annual framework. The Hungarian 
Ambassador to the EU, Peter Gyorkos, responded in relief: ‘For us it could be a very 
heavy heritage’ (EU Observer, 15/XII/2010). 
 
The Competition Council mainly focused on the EU 2020 strategy and, within it, on 
activating the Monti Report. The report addressed the question of how to empower the 
single market as a cornerstone of European integration and sustainable growth. Reaching 
sustainable growth is clearly an objective of the EU 2020 strategy. During the Belgian 
Presidency the Council adopted a two-year plan regarding the Commission’s Single 
Market Act, launching 50 initiatives aimed at completing the EU internal market. The 
Council invited the Commission to set up priority measures to be put in place before 2012 
and to continue examining the Single Market Act. 
 
Another important achievement of the Belgian Presidency was the breakthrough in the EU 
patent dossier, that aims to establish a single patent for the entire Union. Towards the end 
of the Presidency’s term, an enhanced cooperation procedure was launched to allow nine 
or more EU Members to request the European Commission to start preparing a proposal 
for an EU-wide patent system. The Belgian Minister of the Economy, Vincent van 
Quickenborne, failed to obtain unanimous approval but garnered the support of 23 
Member States. Spain and Italy were strongly opposed to the agreement based on 
‘language discrimination’. Finally, a joint request by 11 Member States was issued, which 
the Commission presented to the Council and the EP. This breakthrough in the EU patent 
dossier is significant and a great success for the Belgian Presidency. 
 
Environment and Health 
A highly sensitive debate was held on the revision of the Eurovignette Directive. The 
revision was aimed at developing a transport pricing system to cover, besides costs of 
maintaining and building infrastructure, the negative costs of freight transportation, ie, 
pollution and noise. As environmental NGOs were in opposition to the transport lobby, the 
EU’s institutions struggled to reach a compromise on the revision. The Belgian Presidency 
managed to adopt a compromise proposal allowing –for the first time under EU 
legislation– environmental charging. 
 
Another success of the Belgian Presidency was the compromise on cross-border 
healthcare. The difficult compromise was achieved at the ambassadorial COREPER level 
and paved the way for a Directive to be in force as early as 2013. The Cross-border 
Health Directive aims to allow retired people, people with rare diseases and people living 
in border areas to receive the best medical care possible. 
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Conclusion: The domestic political turmoil in Belgium has marginalised the image-
building opportunity provided by the rotating Presidency of the Council. Belgium risked at 
the start of its term to have only a limited influence on the European political agenda due 
to the national coalition talks overshadowing the Presidency. However, the strong 
balancing effects built in to Belgium’s federal structure and the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional 
set-up allowed it to successfully conclude its Presidency. Besides, the persistent Belgian 
political impasse allowed the caretaker government to preside over the entire term. 
Considering that the government had lost its political legitimacy after the June 2010 
election, the strategy was to concentrate on an administrative rather than political 
leadership in the Council. This gave the Presidency the opportunity to function as an 
honest broker and use its ample experience in public service to avoid losing influence on 
the European political agenda. 
 
The Belgian Presidency prioritised the full implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and 
attempted to eliminate ambiguities concerning the new roles of the permanent European 
Council President and the High Representative. By doing so, the Presidency allowed 
them to develop their institutional overseeing capacities. The results of the upcoming 
Hungarian and Polish presidencies should indicate whether a precedent has been set for 
a weaker role of the rotating Presidency. 
 
The Belgian Presidency made substantial progress on tough EU dossiers. In general and 
foreign affairs steps were taken on the European Citizens’ Initiative, the European 
External Action Service and enlargement issues. Trade agreements were also finalised 
with Pakistan and South-Korea. Further, significant steps were taken on competition and 
economic and financial affairs, while agreements were reached on the EU patent dossier, 
financial supervision and economic governance. In environment and healthcare, 
agreements were made on the Eurovignette dossier and cross-border healthcare. 
 
Mike Beke 
EU analyst, former researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS ), 
Brussels 
 
